Burngrange Nos.1 and 2 (oil Shale) Mine, Midlothian by Bryan, A. M.
• 
• 
""... .... r , -- • 
.1 
.. 
_ I v 
f\\;>. . .-, » ·n. '- , 
MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER 
BURNGRANGE 
Nos. I AND 2 (Oil Shal�) MINE, 
MIDLOTHIAN 
REPORT 
On the Causes of, and Circumstances attending, 
the Explosion and Fire which occurred on the 
loth January, 1947, at the Burngrange 
Nos. I and 2 (Oil Shale) Mine, Midlothian 
By A. M. BRYAN, J.P., B.Sc. 
H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines 
Prtltlt eJ 6y tIlt Minilt�r of Futl Il1Id Powtr to Pdrlidlfullt 
6y Commlllld 0/ Hil Ma;uty 
O,toW 19+7 
LONDON 
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 






MINISTRY OF FUEL AND POWER 
BURNGRANGE 
Nos. I AND 2 (Oil Shale) MINE, 
MIDLOTHIAN 
REPORT 
On the Causes of, and Circumstances attending, 
the Explosion and Fire which occurred on the 
loth January, 1947, at the Burngrange 
Nos. I and 2 (Oil Shale) Mine, Midlothian 
By A. M. BRYAN, l.P., B.Sc. 
H.M. Chief Inspector of Mines 
• 
. 
Prrwtted by tht MiniJ/tr of F�' (1IJd Powtr 10 Poriiamrnl 
by Command of HiI MajtflY 
Octo/Jtr t 9.1 7 
LONDON 
• 
HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
SITUATION AND OWNERSHIP OF Mt:>;!'" · . 
DESCRIPTION OP MINE AXD METHOD OF WORltlNG 
MANAQEMENT Ot TilE ',II�J:: • •  • • · . 
• • 
• • 
GENERAL OBSERVA1·10N� ON THE EXPLO�ION AND SUBSEQUENT FIRES • •  
NARRATIVE OF TH"; tXPI.OSlON, FIR!':'" AND RECOVERY OPERATIONS 
CoMMENTS ON 
First W<lI"llIn� of the E:\-pl(l�lon 
I"'ractice of stoopmg In the centre of a \cnttlating distnct 
Occurrence of Tnflammable Ca ... 
Cause of the l�xplo!-;lOn and It:-. development 
Development of the Fires 
























Adequacy �If the prt:'Cautlon .. taken to .. afeguard agamst danger from lnflammable 
Gas • • 16 
CoNCLUSIONS 
RECOMl!oU;:NDATIONS 




ApPKN1}IX 11. Partll;uian; of Persons Killed 
PLAN No. I. Lay·out of the workings .. 
· . 
• • 
PLAN 1\'0.2. Places of work prior to the occurrence 
• 
· . 
. .  
· . 
· . · . 
. .  . .  
. .  
. .  
. .  • • 
. .  










On the Causes of, God Circumstances attending. the Explosion and 
Fire which occurred at Burngrauge Nos, 1 and 2 (Oil Shale) 
Mine, Midlothian, on the 10th January, 1947 
To THE RIGHT HONOUR.4.BlE EMANUEL SHINWELL, M.P., 
M.inister of Fuel and Power. 
SIR, 
15Seplemb<Y, 1947. 
EXPLOSION AND FIRE AT BURNGRANGE Nos. I AND 2 
(Oil hale) MINE, MIDLOTHIAN 
I n  compliance with your direction, I have held a formal In\'c�tigation undl:r 
the provisions of Section 83 of the Coal Mines Act, 1911, and under the Ministry 
of Fuel and Power Act, 1945, into the causes of, and circumstances attending, 
the explosion and fire at the Burngrange Nos. 1 and 2 (Oil Shale) Mine, 
Midlothian, on 10th January, 1947. I have now the honour to submit tht 
following Report. 
1. The Inquiry commenced in the Sea field Institute, \Vest Calder, at 
10.:m a.m. on Tuesday, 25th March, 19-17. and was concluded on \Vednesday, 
26th March. A list of the thirty-one witnesses examined in the course of thf" 
proceedings is given in Appendix l. 
PARTIES AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES 
2. The parties who appeared at the Inquiry and the names of the repre­
sentatives are set out below :-
Mr. A. H. Steele, 
H.M. Divisional Inspector of Mines. 
1Ir. T. A. Hogers, 
H.M. District Jnspector of Mines. 
Mr. Robert Crichton, 
Managing Director. 
Mr. John M. Caldwell, 
General Mines Manager. 
Mr. Waiter Nellies, M.B.E., J.P., 
General Secretary. 
�Ir. James McKelvic, 
Organiser. 
The Ministry of Fuel and 
Power. 
, 
Young's Paraffin Light Ix 
Mineral Oil Co., Ltd. 
National Union of Shale 
Miners and Oil \Vorker ... 
lTUATION AND OWNERSHIP OF MINE 
3. Burngrange Shale Mine is situated about 16 miles south-west of Edinburgh 
in the Parish of \Vest Calder in the County of Midlothian. It is owned by 
Young's Paraffin Light & Mineral Oil Co., Ltd., which is a subsidiary of Scottish 
Oils, Ltd., and is one of a group of 12 mines working the oil shales in the 
Counties of Midlothian and West Lothian. 
(82532) .' 
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BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF MINE AND METHOD OF WORKING 
4. The Burngrange mine is relatively new, having started production in 1936. 
There are two vertical shafts, each 14 ft. in diameter and brick lined throughout. 
No. I !'haft is used for winding men, minerals and other materials. No. 2 
shaft is used for ventilation and pumping. Both shafts are sunk to a depth of 
468 ft. to work the Dunnet Shale Seam, which varies in thickness from 
9 to 12 ft. The dip of the seam in the No. 2 district of the mine is variable, 
averaging I in 5 in a north-westerly direction. The mine is ventilated by 
a double inlet Sirocco exhausting fan passing about 100,000 cubic feet of air 
per minute at a water gauge of 0-95 in. All workings are in the Dunnet Shale 
Seam. The average daily output of shale over two winding shifts is 600 tons. 
The number of persons employed is approximately 29 on the surface and 
176 underground, giving a total of 205 persons. 
5. The method of working is stoop and room. The size of the stoops varie:; 
according to the depth, but in the area affected by the explosion, the stoops 
are formt!d approximately 150 ft. by 110 ft. by driving rooms 12 ft. wide and 
9 ft. high on level course and at right angles thereto. \,yhere the seam exceeru. 
9 ft. in height, the top shale is left to form a roof. In the second working, when 
the stoops are being extracted, splits are first driven through each stoop to 
form small pillars which are then extracted by taking off lifts 12 rt. wide and 
the full height of the seam. Pillar extraction is generally arranged so as to 
fonn and maintain a main roof-fracture line at an angle of about 45° to the 
levels. 
6. Plan No. t shows the lay-out and full extent of the underground workings, 
the general direction of the ventilation and the quantities of air passing in each 
ventilating split. The disaster was confined to one ventilating split which 
ventilated part of No. 3 District and the whole of No. 2 District. The latter 
District comprises two sections of workings, one in which the pillars were being 
extracted and one to the east of it where the large stoops were being split 
into small pillar:;. From Plan No. 1 it will be seen that an area of fully three 
acres of shale has been completely extracted to the north-east of a middle dook 
which, although sometimes known as the 40 H.P. dook, will be referred to 
hereinafter as No. 2 dook. Extraction of the stoops in this area commenced 
in November, 1945, and was being continued on the west side of the area. 
From the inbye ends of Nos. 10 to 14 Levels-see Plan No. I-and to the east 
of the stooped area, the stoops were being split into pillars. These pillars 
were to be left to avoid subsidence and damage to a housing scheme on the 
surface. It ",,'as in this section Qf the workings that all but one of the 15 victims 
of the disaster lost their lives. Preparatory splitting of stoops prior to 
extraction was also proceeding in the No. 3 District on the out bye or west 
side of the extraction area. 
7. The shale is got by blasting, and is hand-filled by the miners into 20-cwt. 
capacity hutches which are hand drawn for relatively short distances by 
drawer::; to a subsidiary mechanical haulage. Thereafter, the hutches are 
hauled by Diesel locomotive and main rope haulage to the shaft bottom. 
The explosive used is compressed gunpowder fired by fuse. The holes for 
blasting are bored by electrically operated drilling ma(hines. All underground 
machinery is electrically operated. 
8. A mixed system of lighting, comprising open lights and safety lamps, is 
in use underground. Although firedamp was of rare occurrence, its presence 
was not unknown and, in consequence, certain precautions were taken. It 
was customary for the miner at the working face to use an approved electric 
safety cap lamp and to be provided with an approved flame safety lamp 
• 
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which was hung up near the working face. The drawers, who carried these 
flame safety Jamps in and out of the mine. and the other outbye workmen 
used open acetylene cap lamps. Rules posted at the mine regarding the U"C 
of safely lamps were as follows:-
" FACEMEN IN CHARGE OF PLACES SHALL USE ELECTRIC CAP LAMPS. 
FLAME SAFETY LAMPS SHALL BE I<EPT IN WORKING PLACES. 
BEFORE ENTERING PLACES AT THE COMllENCEMENT OF WORK AND BEFORE 
AND AFTER SUOT-FIRING, THE FACEMEN SHALL TEST FOR THE PRESENCE 
OF GAS." 
MANAGD!ENT OF THE MINE 
9. The mine, being a mine under the Coal Mines Act, 1911, was under the 
daily supervision of a certificated manager, Mr. John Brownlie McArthur. who 
was assisted by a certificated under-manager, Mr. Archihald Gibb RusseU. 
Supervising them was Mr. Jobn Stein, the Agent, who in turn came under 
the direction of Mr. John Caldwell and �{r. Robert Crichton, General Mines 
Manager and Managing Director, respectively, of Scottish Oils, Ltd., all holders 
of first class certificates of competency in mine management and all of whom, 
to a greater or lesser degree, took part in the technical management of the mine. 
, 
THE EXPLOSION AND SUB EQUENT FIRES-GENERAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
10. The e.xpio::.ion occurred about 8 p.m. in the sixth hour of the afternoon 
shift on Friday, 10th January. 19-17, when 76 persons were at work underground. 
It originated at the face of the rise split of! No. 14 Level, onc of James Todd's 
working places in the No. 2 District, when firedamp was ignited at an open 
acetylene cap lamp. Fifty-three persons were employed in the district at 
the time. One man, John l\IcGarty, who was blown down by the force of the 
explosion, received injuries from which he died a few minutes later. The 
initial explosion started fires which spread to various parts of the district and, 
subsequently, 14 men employed in the section of narrow workings on the 
return side of the extraction area, lost their lives by the effect of the after­
damp and fumes from the initial explosion and the subsequent fires. A List 
of the victims of the disaster, with their ages and occupations, togethrr with 
the nature of the injuries sustained, as prepared by Dr. \V. C. Sharp, H.M.l'I1ines 
Medical Officer for the Scottish Division, is given in Appendix 1I. 
1 1. A disaster of this magnitude is unique in shale mining and for this reason 
a short note on the background of the lndustry may prove useful. Oil shale 
has been worked in the nt!ighbourhood since 1858, and on a scale so extensiv(" 
that by 1865 there were no less than 120 works processing the oil shales of Ihe 
Lothians or cannel shales of the coal measures. The oil shales of the Lothians 
occur in the Calciferous Sandstone cries near the base of the Carboniferous 
System and constitute a local development peculiar to \Vest Lothian, Mid­
lothian and adjacent portions of the Counties of Fife and Lanark. The annual 
output of shale from mines owned by six different operating companies reached 
a maximum of approximately three and a quarter million tons in 1913. All 
the different owning companies were brought under one management in 1919 
by the formation of Scottish Oils, Ltd. For many reasons, since 19 13, mainly 
arising from the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, there have been considerable 
fluctuation and decline in the annual output which, for the year 1946, was 
just over one and a third million tons. 
(82532) 
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NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION, FIRES AND RECOVERY 
OPERATIONS 
12. About 8 p.m. on the night of Friday, 10th January, during the ordinary 
course of work on the afternoon shift, three men, James Todd, Thomas Rcid 
and John McGartr. were at work in two adjoining stooping places-No. 14 
Level face and a rise split a short distance out-bye from the face of 1-1 Le\"el-
111 the stooping section in the No. 2 District. Todd, who was an experienced 
:::.hale miner, was the faceman in charge of these two places; Rcid and McGarty 
were his drawers. In accordance with the C'J,.lstom of the mine, Todd used an 
electric safety cap Jamp and Reid an open acetylene cap lamp, but l\tcGarty, 
contrary to custom, used an electric safety cap lamp. In addition, however, 
each drawer carried a flame safety lamp, onp for use in each of the two working 
places. which was suspended near the face while work wac; in progress. In 
accordance \\ ith the rules of the mine, these safety lamps were used by Todd, 
who had received instruction in gas testing, to examine the places for gas 
prior to the commencement of work and also prior to and following shot-firing. 
The three men had worked in the two places that afternoon from about 3.30 p.m. 
until about 7 p.m. when they went outbye to eat some food, taking with 
them the two flame safety lamps. There was no shot-firing in these places 
that afternoon. About 8 p.m. the three men returned to the \\"orking places, 
fodd and Heid to the rise split and l'kGarty to the face of No. 14: Level. Todd 
" wearing" his electric cap lamp and carrying a flame safcty lamp in his hand, 
went fir�t to examine for gas at the face of the rise split, while Reid, his drawer, 
remained at the entrance to the split to clear some fallen shale which Todd 
had pulled down on his way out at meal time. It appears that, during the 
meal intcn'al, the roof in the split to the rise had been" weighting" headlr 
and had broken most of the timber props set to support the roof. The appear­
ance of the place on his return was such a surprise to Todd that, most 
unfortunately as it turned out, hefore actually examining it for gas, he called 
Rcid up to sce it. \Vhen Reid had reached a point about 5 yds. from the face, 
his open acetylcne cap lamp ignited gas near the roof. The ignition was 
accompanied by a rumbling noise and the flame travelled towards the waste. 
Todd ::.houtcd to Reid and l\kGarty to clear out. Todd and Reid had jus._ 
commenced to run outbyc when a second report was heard and they were 
more or less blown clown the split, a distance of about IS ft.. and slightly 
stunned. \Vhen they had sufficiently reco\'crcd they callcd for McGarty; 
they got no response but heard groaning and found him lying unconscious 
in the middle of No. 14 Level roadway about 40 Ct. back from his working face. 
In rushing out of his working place he had either been knocked off his balance 
or had been blown down by the force of the explosion and. in falling, had 
fractured his �kull. Todd immediately went outbye for assistance, which was soon 
forthcoming, as the men from the adjacent places werc by this time on their 
way out bye. A fe\v minutes later a stretcher party came in for McGarty and 
carricd him outbye. He never recovered consciousness and died on the way 
out. 
13. The evidcnce of the workmen in the adjacent stooping places to the 
dip and rise �ide of Todd's working places supported the statements of Todd 
and Reid that there were at least two mild explosions, the noise of the second 
being rather louder than that of the first. One workman likened the noise of 
the first explosion to that of a "weU·defined shot ", while the second he 
described as being" louder and fiercer". A measure of the degree of violence 
is givcn by the phy!)ical effects observed in the stooping place immediately to 
the dip of No. 14 Level. 1 n this place, the concussion or shock from the explosion 
was sufficient to extinguish the open acctylene tights, dislodge a flame saCety 
lamp suspcnded by its hook, cause the workmen in the place to lose their 
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balance, and raie;(' a dense cloud of dust i.nto the atmo-;phere. The physical 
effects observed in the place immediately to the rise of Todd's place wen' 
similar. .In this place, however, a workman saw a .. lighting up of the stoops ,. 
which he considered to be a reflection from a flame travelling up the waste, 
while in the next place to the rise, the workmen actually saw a flame pas:".ing 
up the waste and stated that they lay down on the pavement until it passed. 
The workmen in other stooping places more remote (rom Todd's, although 
they did not see flame, experienced similar physical effects to those just 
described, but to a lesser degree, and so all got waming that something out 
of the ordinary had occurred which caused them to leave their working pbce ... 
without delay and proceed outbye. They all got out safely and thus McGartv 
was the only casualty in the stooping section. 
14. The story now tums to the happenings in the section to the east and 
on the return side of the stooped area, where the stoops were being split. The 
principal ·evidence relating to this section was given by a 17-year-old 
bencher" Alexander Todd, who was employed on the No. 3 Dook (src plan). 
His duties were to detach the empties from the dook haulage at the variou .. 
benches and d�patch the full hutches in rakes or trains of three. Shortl� 
after 8 p.m. he was sitting at the bench at the junction of No. 13 Level with 
No. 3 Dook, talking to two drawers, Sa.m Pake and David Muir, who had coml' 
out with full hutches ready to take empties back to the face, when he said 
he felt two " wafts of air ", which extinguished their acetylene lights. 1-1(' 
felt somewhat frightened. After relighting their lamps, Pake and Muir teased 
Todd a little and then proceeded towards the face, each taking an empty 
hutch. Todd stated that, \vhen they left him, they told him they were going in 
.. to tell the hoys ". It seems clear, however, they did not rcaLi:se that anything 
serioLJs had happened-alleast nothing that called for a warninl! of immediate 
danger to the men in bye. Indeed, later investigations proved that the empties 
they had taken inbye \,,,'ere filled with shalc-operations which would take 
about 25 minutes. After Pake and l\Iuir left him, Todd coupled the full hutche� 
at the bench and then proceeded to signal for the empty rake or train to be 
lowered. \Vhen it arrivcd he noticed a lot of smoke coming down with the air 
He signalled for the rake to stop at No. 13 Level and, getting into it and putting 
out his light, he signalled for it to be hauled up again. As he approached the 
top of the dook, he noticed the dust and smoke in the air were thicker. As 
soon as the rake stopped at the top of the dook hc called to the lad employed 
at the dook-head and to the haulage engine attendant, and they all immcdiately 
went out bye, as they said It to get fresh air" for, by this time, the atmospherl' 
at the top of the No. 3 dook was thick with dust, smokc and fumcs. After 
waiting a little out bye, the engineman and Todd attempted to go inbye again 
to get their clothes, but they were unable to do so because of the smoke and 
fumes. This was probably about 8.20 p.m. so that by this time the plight 
of the inbye men was already very precarious. 
15. At this time there were 14 men, induding Pake and Muir, in the variou ... 
working places on the inbye side of No. 3 Dook and it is apparent they did 
not realise the danger that beset them until it was loo late. Not one of them 
got out alive. Except for Pake and Muir, all of them, in my opinion, were too 
remote from the site of the explosion to notice anything unusual at the time 
it happened. Believing. as I do, that neither Pake nor Muir had conveyed any 
warning that something untoward had occurred, the first warning the inbye 
men would get would be from the foul condition of the air current as a result 
of contamination by the after�damp, smoke and dust from the initial explosion 
and the subsequent fires. And since there is evidence that some short�circuitins 
of the air current had occurred as a result of the explosion by rca�on of the 
disturbance and displacement of brattice screens separating the intake from 
• 
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the rclum near the entrance to the inbye section, this warning would not be 
conveyed to them as strongly or as quickly as it would have been had the 
!>CTCCIlS remained intact and the full ventilation taken its normal course. It 
is prob�ble too that even when the first signs of fouling in the air current 
reached them they would not realize the danger, and probably thought it due 
lo the reek of shots that had been fired later than usual somewhere outbye and 
on the intake side 01' them. They would certainly not suspect that the 
atmosphere was fouled by the after-damp of an explosion or by the smoke and 
fumes from underground fires. By the time they did reali.lc that something 
unusual and dangerous had occurrcd, all tl\ree ways of exit from the inbye 
workings-No. 11 Level, No. 10 Level or Diesel Road. and the Return Airway­
had become impassable by reason of the deadly smoke-laden atmosphere 
in them, which Il1U�t have contained a dangerous proportion of carbon 
monoxide. 
16. There was some speculation as to whether the inbye men would ha\,(­
had time to get out safely had Pake and Muir realized at the time they were 
la::.t speaking with Alexander Todd that something really serious had happened 
and had they made it their business to rush into the section and warn the 
other men to clear out without delay. I believe the majority of the men would 
have got out alive had they received and responded promptly to an earl\' 
warning, and it is just possible that all would have succeeded. 
17. The first serious attempt to explore the workings on the inbye side of the 
... tooped area where the 15 men were trapped was not made until about 8.35 or 
8.40 p.m. It so happened that at the time of the explosion there were no 
officials in the immediate vicinity. The back-shift fireman, George Crombie, 
was outbye at the junction of t\1clntyre's Dook with No. 10 Level 011 his way 
home, while the shift overman, David Brown, had gone to the surface for 
consultations and his meal. About 8.15 or 8.20 p.m. Brown was in the office 
discussing pit business with the manager, Mr. J. B. l\1cArthur, when a mcssage 
was received from the windmg engineman that" a Doctor and an ambulance 
were wanted for l\IcGarty and that there had been an explosion ". Reference 
to this message and the significance attached to it by its recipients will be made 
later. For the present, suffice it to say that, after arranging for a telephone 
message to be sent to the Doctor to come at once to the colliery and, aftcr 
collecting some morphia ampoules, the overman and the manager both went 
down the pit. At this time it was 8.20 p.m. 
18, "'hen going down No. 1 or l\1clntyre's Dook, they \"'ere told by one of 
the outgoing men that an explosion had occurred somewhere in the region of 
James Todd's place, that a stretcher party was bringing out l\1cGarty, that 
all the other men in the stooping section were safe, but that he had no informa­
lion about the men in the inside dook section. The overman, Brown, then 
h�nded over his morphia ampoules to the manager and proceeded post hastc 
inbye towards the No. 3 Dook while the manager proceeded to the stooping 
section. On his way Brown picked up the fireman, Crombie, and both went 
in by No. 10 Level to explore the position in the narrow workings on the inbye 
side of the No. 3 Dook. When they got as far as the heading on the out bye 
"ide of No. 2 Dook, they encountered smoke coming up from it and still more 
�mokc coming up the No. 2 Dook itself, in the general body of the air. It was 
not sufficiently dense, however, to prevent Brown and Crombie from going 
further along No. 10 LeveL They managed to get in almost to the top of the 
No. 3 Dook. In passing the junction of the heading between No. 2 and No. 3 
Dook, they encountered still more smoke coming up this heading. At this 
time they were not affected by heat but, because of the smoke, they had 




19. After waiting a few minutes, Brown made another attempt, alone, to 
get inbye. He stated that, on this occasion, he actually got in tQ the No. 3 
dook-head, where he shouted but got no response. Neither did he see any 
signs of the inbye men nor of their lights, and he was forced to withdraw again. 
On hjs way outbye. he again met Crambie, who said he had been trying to 
improve the atmospheric conditions in the inbye section by a partial opening 
of some brattice screen doors. But this step was of no avai1. The atmospheric 
conditions were getting worse all the time, due to the spreading of the fire:., the 
extent and seriousness of which were not fuUy realized at this time. Brown, 
however, did realize the seriousness of the position in relation to the trapped 
men and immediately sent word to the manager who was dealing with fires in 
the stooping section, explaining the position, asking for all possible assistance 
and making it quite clear that there was no hope of undertaking Curther ex­
ploratory work without the use of rescue teams wearing self-contained breathing 
apparatus. He then set out to discover for himseI£ where all the smoke was 
coming from. At this point, it is convenient to leave the story of the attempts 
to rescue the trapped men and consider the fire position. 
20. Although no sign of fire was observed when the stretcher party removed 
McGarty from No. 1-1 Level Face, very soon afterwards small fires were 
discovered in No. 14 Level and in the upset off it, and also at the waste edge in 
the split off No 15 Level. At this time the fires seemed relatively unimportant 
and to be confined to burning timber on the floor. The manager detailed men 
to fight these fires with the underground fire-fighting equipment at hand, 
con!'.isting of sand from portable sand boxes placed at the various working 
levels and portable fire-extinguishers collected from the various motor rooms and 
other places in the vicinity. But, small as the fires were, with the equipment 
then available, the men could not do more than keep them in check. It was 
obvious, too, that the relatively small fires discovered at this early stage could 
not account for the dense volumes of smoke and fumes that were by this time 
reaching No. 11 Level just out bye No. 3 Inside Dook. Later, another small 
fire was discovered at the waste edge in No. 13 Level and a much larger fire 
in the heading or upset on the inbye side of No. 2 Dook. 
2 1 .  The manager quickly realized the seriousness of the situation as well as 
the urgent need for additional fire-fighting appliances and the services of the 
trained mines rescue brigades. Being satisfied that the fire-fighting services 
of the mine were in full operation and that everything possible was being done 
that could be done in the circumstances, he proceeded to the surface to make the 
neccs."alY arrangements. Urgent calb for full assistance were scnt to the 
National Fire Service and the Min('s Rescue Station, key men and trained 
rescue men were ::oent for and tht! neces!'ary materials for fire-fighting and 
rescue work collected. The National Fire Ser\'ice received the call at 9.25 p.m. 
and an officer and four men arrived at the mine from their station eight mile::; 
distant at 9.40 p.m. in the mobile fire engine, with fire-fightin� equipment, 
including two Pro to one-hour self-contained breathing sets. The Mines Rescue 
Station Superintendent at Edinburgh received a call at 9.20 p.m. and he and 
his assistant arrived at the mine in the Mines Rescue Car with all necessary 
equipment, at 10.30 p.m., where the trained members of the colliery rescue 
team were awaiting them. 
22. Although the National Fire Service wm. never intended for fire-fighting 
underground in mines, nevertheless, the team at once volunteered for this 
duty. Two members of the team donned their onc-hour Proto Breathing 
Apparatus. Underground, they met the ovennan, Brown, who pleaded for the 
use of the two sets of Proto Apparatus, so that he and another trained member 
of the Burngrange Mincs Rcscue Team-J. McArthur-could make another 
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attempt to get into the workings beyond No. 3 Dook. After handing over 
their apparatus, the National Fire Service team were taken into No. 14 Level 
where they tackled the fire with portable fire extinguishers. Attention had 
to be directed, ho\\'cver, to the far mOTC serious fire which had been found in 
the heading beyond No. 2 Dook by a trained mines fescue brigade, now in 
action. After making the necessary arrangements for a supply of water to 
the inbye workings and getting their portable pumps and hose brought down 
the mine, the National Fire Service men commenced fighting this fire under 
the charge of N.F.S. Superintendent MuiT, who had also arrived. :'Iline official::> 
and trained mines rescue men, under Superintendent Davidson, were in 
attendance all the time to guide th.,em and keep watch on the condition of the 
atmosphere and roadways. The other smaller fires were kept under control, 
but the fighting of this larger fi.re was a long, arduous and difficult job. Until 
it could be brought under control, recue operations beyond it wcre impossible. 
At one time as much as 600 gallons of water per minute were played on it. 
23. In the meantime, Brown and lIicArthur, using the one-hour Proto sets 
borrowed from the N.F.S., had made an unsuccessful attempt to reach the 
trapped men. This sortie enabled them to give some details of the position 
when the full mines rescue brigade came into action under the direction of 
Superintendent Davidson. The first team, designated" Oils No. 5 Brigade ", 
descended the mine ready for action at 10.30 p.m., accompani�d by Super­
intendent Davidson, his assistant R. )fclntosh and Mr. John Caldwell, tht' 
General Mines Manager, who had just arrived at the mine. Instructions were 
left for the " 01b No . .t Brigade" to dress and follow on. Underground, a 
fresh air base was established at McIntyre's Dook, where the stretchers, 
revivers and birds were left under the care of Daddson and :\IcIntne. At 
11.15 p.m., under the captaincy of the indefatigable ovemlan, Bro;'..,.n, Oils 
No. 5 Brigade, wearing goggles and using a life-line, set off with instructions to 
explore No. 10 Level and try to make contact with the trapped men. SWf"ating 
profusely, the brigade returned at 11.30 p.m. with a report that the temperature 
was very high and the smoke so dense that they could not see each other's 
lights. Nevertheless, the brigade insisted on trying again. The fresh-air base 
was moved forward 172 yards and the team once more set off. On returning, 
lhey reported having reached a point near the No. 3 Dook, where they 
encountered a fall of stone and bad roof conditions. They also heard signs 
of strata movement and" weighting" and stated that they could not examine 
the conditions because of the thick smoke in the atmosphere. The brigade 
then attempted to reach the men by way of No. 11 Level but found this 
impossible because of a serious fire burning at the junction of the first heading 
beyond No. 2 Dook. Following the discovery of this fire and the report on the 
atmospheric conditions by the rescue brigade, it was clear to all that there was 
no hope of reaching the trapped men until this fire was under control. All 
efforts were now concentrated in getting the ma.ximum fire-fighting power into 
action. It was decided that this work could be undertaken by the National 
Fire Service men without breathi.ng apparatus, so long as they were accom­
panied by a trained mines rescue brigade, provided with oil flame safety 
lamps and birds, to keep watch on the atmospheric conditions and on the 
conditions of the roof and sides of the roadways. 
24. The work of fire-fighting continued without abatement and it was not 
until four days later, on the night of the 13/14th January that it was considered 
practicable to send a rescue team to explore beyond the fire area. On this 
night the Oils No. 2 Brigade went in and came back with a report that they 
had found the bodies of eight men lyi.ng in the No. 3 Dook. By this time 
the atmosphere \vas much clearer and the temperature only a little above 
norn1al. Thereafter, the district was quickly explored and aU the bodies 
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located and [('covered. The positions in which the 14 bodies were found arc 
shown on Plan No. 2, which also shows the nonnal working places of all the 
deceased men. It will be seen that, with the exception of onc body. that of 
G. Easton. all the bodies were found in No. 3 Dook. There was evidence to 
show that Eastoll had attempted to brattice off the face of No. 13 Level, the 
place where hi� body was found. in an attempt to shield himc;elf (rom the noxiau ... 
atmosphere. .\ study of the details shown on Plan No. 2, such a.;;; articles of 
clothing, lamps, tools. etc., also indicates quite clearly that the virtims, when 
they did try to escape, had tried "c\'eral alternative routes. 
25. From Appendix H it will be seen that of the IS victims of the diS3!:.tu 
only two sustained bums. They were \V. Findlay and \V. Ritchic. Although 
burned, they nevertheless died from the same cause as the other trapped men, 
viz. the effects of carbon monoxide as a result of breathing the aflerdamp. 
It is, however, somewhat strange that they hould be the only two persons 
to sustain burns and :11,,0 difficult to explain. 
. 
26. Plan No. 2 shows their places of work prior to the occurrence and abo 
the situations in which their bodies were found. No onc can say, of cour<;(' , 
whether or not they were in fact actually in their working places at the time 
of the explosion, but if they were it is difficult to believe that they could bC' 
burned without the persons working alongside them also being burned. More­
over, there was no evidence of the passage of flame or hot ga�s in either of their 
working places. It would appear then that they were not burned in thrir 
place of work. 
27. There may be some significance in the situations in which their bodil� 
were subsequently found. Findlay was at the lower end of the row of bodies 
on the No. 3 Dook, while Ritchie was at the other. It may be that both men 
had attempted to find a ,,"ay out, Findlay by No. 10 Level and Ritchie by No. 11 
Level, and that both were caught by fire, hot gases or even a slight inflammation 
of firedamp. Fortunately, the matter is not important so far as the ascertain­
ment of the cause of this disaster is concerned. 
28. Tt will also be recalled that when Pake and Muir left the bench at the 
junction of No. 13 Level with No. 3 Dook, at the time of the explosion, they 
each took inbye an empty hutch. \Vhen No. 13 Level was explored, there 
were no empty hutches at the face but two full hutches were found on the 
level. It was given in evidence by several witnesses that to draw and fill 
these two hutches would take not less than 25 minutes, indicating that, during 
this period, the atmospheric conditions inbye were not such as would indicate 
serious or immediate danger. This confmns the view that Pake and l'Iluir had 
either not appreciated the significance or potential danger of the unusual 
happening which occurreCl at the actual time of the explosion and which 
caused their lights to be extinguished and Todd to be frighteneJ or, if they did, 
they had been unable to convince the men inbye that there was something 
so seriou�ly wrong as to warrant instant withdrawal. As previously indica.ted. 
my opinion is that they did not realize the position and that they did not givl' 
any warning. Nor do I think them blameworthy in any degree. Older and 
more experienced men failed to realize the immediate danger, and, as will bE' 
seen, even the management did not believe at first that it was possible for an 
explosion to have occurred. Nevertheless, it would appear that had the inhyt 
men received and heeded an immf'diate warning they might have aU been 
alive to·day. 
29. The exploration also reveal�d evidence of intense heat in the upset 
leading from the waste edge at No. 12 Level across Nos. I1 and 10 Levels and 
thence past the 29 H.P. hauler in the direction of the return airway. rt will 
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be remembered that it was in this upset that the most serious fire occurred and 
from which the greatest volumes of smoke and fumes had come. The heat 
undoubtedly damaged the brattice screens in this upset and thus led to some 
direct short-circuiting of the poisonous and smoke and dust-laden atmosphere 
from the explosion and flfC area to the return airway. In this way the warning 
to the inbye men would be delayed and the return ainvay would be fouled by a 
poisonous atmosphere in the early stages of the disaster and thus a most 
likely means of egress for the victims cut off. 
COMMENTS 
OK TIlE FIRST \VARNING OF TIfE EXPLOSION AND TilE FAILURE TO ApPRECIATE 
ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
30. The explosion- occurreel about 8 p.ol. and the first message concerning 
it was telephoned to the surface about 8.20 p.m. The winding engineman who 
received it transmitted it at once to the manager, who was then discussing 
mine business with the ovemlan, David Brown. The message was that 
" a doctor and an ambulance were wanted for McGarty, and that there had 
been an explosion ".  The manager's immediate reactions, in his own words 
were :-
" I  gave the meS!)age thought and I considered the word ' explosion ' 
was wrong. I could not conceive of an explosion in McGarty's place, but I 
could conceive of a sew're fall of roof giving a report like an explosion. On 
the other hand, had the word ' explosion ' been right, I could not concei\'1! 
Qf a big explosion being there " .  
3 1. I t  is clear that the manager, from his long experience in oil-shale mining, 
thought that there might possibly have been a small ignition of gas but thought 
it more likely that there had been a heavy fall of roof. He certainly could not, 
at the time, bring himself to believe that an explosion of a serious nature had 
occurred. And in this view he was not alone. Consequently, it never occurred 
to him or to the ovennan, to call for the services of the Mines Rescue Station. 
He did, however, send for the doctor before he and the overman went down 
the mine to investigate what had happened. 
32. The significant point is that, had the managt'r realized there had been 
a serious explo�ion, he would have called for the services of the Mines Rescue 
Station at least one hour and ten minutes earlier than he, in fact, did, and 
the question arises as to whether lives would have been saved had the trained 
brigades been in action 70 minutes sooner than they were. This means that 
the first fully equipped team, wearing seH-contained breathing apparatus, 
would have left the fresh·air base at lO.S p.m. and been at the top of No. 3 
Dook or its vicinity about 10.IS p.m. By this time, the overman, Brown, 
had already made at least three, if not four, unsuccessful attempts to reach 
the men. On his first attempt at about 8.40 p.m. he was affected by the smoke 
and had to retire " for a breather ".  The conditions got worse as time went on. 
After careful consideration of all the circumstances, I am of the opinion that, 
had the rescue brigades been on the scene even at 10 p.m. they would still have 
been too latc to rescue any of the trapped men alive, and I must conclude, 
therefore, that the initial failure by the manager to realize the full significance 
of the first warning did not affect the loss of life involved in this disaster. 
33. Although I can understand the reason why the manager, as well as 
many others, had difficulty in believing the message to be true, nevertheless 




To have called for the scn'ices of the Rescue Station could ha\'c done 110 harm. 
As Mr. T. A. Rogers said at the Inquiry, in reply to a quc�tion put by me : 
" It is far better to send for a Rescue Brigade a dozen times and not 1l"C it 
than not to send once when it is reaUy needed ". 
ON THE PRACTICE OF STOOPI�G IN THE CENTRE OF A VENTILATING DISTRICT 
34. It was suggested at the Inquiry by Mr. Nellies, representing the National 
Union of Shale Miners and Oil \Vorkcrs. that it was not in accordance with 
good mining practice to commence stooping in the middle of a ventilating 
district and that steps should be taken to avoid it in future. Accordingly, 
during the course of the Inquiry, Mr. Nellies, quite rightly, closely examined 
several of the witnesses on the official and management side on this point. 
It  will be seen from Plan No. I that the air current in the ventilation split 
concerned, first traversed some " whole " workings, then cour£ed the working .... 
in the stooping section and thereafter ventilated the working places in the 
narrow workings to the east of No. 3 Dook-the section where the men wcrl! 
trapped-before finally passing to the return airway. II  is h ighly probable 
that in the circumstances of this particular case the death roll would have been 
confined to OTIC person, i\lcGarty, had the stooping section been at the return 
end of the district. 
35. Although it is more or less the general practice, both in oil shale and coal 
mining, to commence stooping at the return end of a ventilation split, the 
stooping of areas otherwise than at the return end is by no means rare or even 
unusual in the long history of oil shale mining, nor indeed of coal lllining. For 
e.xamplc, it is nonnal practice in some coal mines and e:specially in mines 
relatively free from inflammable gas, to e.xtract pillars in one panel simul­
tanf'>Ously with the opening out inbye of the next panel to be stooped. It :;o 
happens that in this Burngrange case, the stooping would almost certainly 
have been at the return end of the ventilation split had it not been considered 
necessary, for the purposes of support of property on the surface, to leave 
small pillars in the area on the return side of the stooping .... ection. After all, 
Burngrange was a mine considered to be relatively free from inflammable 
gas, where naked lights were in use, and where prior to this explosion, then' 
was nothing, in my opinion, which would lead the management or anyone 
else to anticipate any special or increased danger from the method of working 
or the system of ventilation ill use at the time of the disaster. 
36. The occurrence does, however, clearly indicate the greater possibility 
of a major explosion in workings alongside a goaf area compared with " whole . .  
or pillar workings which, in the physical conditions obtaining at Bumgrange, 
nonnally remain open and accessible for the purpose of examination and 
ventilation. The suggestion was made that the practice of stooping in the 
centre of a ventilation split should be prohibited by law, but I am unable to 
subscribe to this view because of the variation in circumstances, and I am in 
agreement with the views expressed in evidence by �fr. J.  Stein, the Agent, 
under examination by Mr. Nellies and Mr. Crichton :-
Exami1zaliou by Mr. Ntl/ies 
Q. Now that the dangers have presented themselvc::., you will agree that 
there ought to be some modification or supplementation of the Regulations 
covering stooping in such circumstances ? 
A.  All future stooping has got 10 receive special consideration in the light 
of what has happened here. 
l �  
Examination by Afr. CrieMon 
Q. 1 don't think you can lay down any special regulations in connex.ion 
with stooping ? I am afraid that ('very section would need to be considered 
on its merits ? 
.\. Yes. 
Q . .  \nd I don't think that, due to this occurrence, you can lav down a11\" 
hard and fast rule ' 
. 
. \. That is what I think. 
Q. And when this plan was arranged for-\\-hen we agreed to start stooping 
herc- r think we were all quite satisfied that it was perfectly safe, or it 
'''''culd never have been started ? 
A. That is so. 
Q.  And therefore the matter could not possibly receive mOTe consideration 
than in any other !'Itooping area ' ' 
A. That is so. 
ON TilE OCct'RRENCE OF bFLA�IMABLE G_b (FIREDAMP) 
37. As already mdicated, although the mine Wa::i relatively free frolll 111-
flammable gas, the presence of gas was not unknown and certain precautions 
were taken to safeguard against danger from it. An examination of the records 
shows that firedamp had been reported on 1 1  occa':>ions during the year 1946. 
In all cases the gas was found in small quantity and in nearly every case at the 
face of rise headings in the solid or " whole " working�. It  was readily cleared 
in a few minutes by the ventilation, following the erection or extension of 
brattice. Contrary to what one might ha\'e expected, inflammable gas has 
never been det('cted in any of the stooping places or at the edge of the adjoining 
goaf or waste. 
38. Filedamp is given off to some extent in alm.ost every tnmc, and because 
of this, Section 29 of the Coal f\[ines Act, 191 1 (which applies to Oil Shale Mines), 
contains stringent requirements regarding the amount of ventilation to be 
provided. r n this case there was no evidence of the ventilation, prior to the 
explosion, having- been at any lime inadequate within the meaning of this 
Section. 
39. I t is obvious, however, that when the initial explo:-.lon occurred, there 
must have been an accumulation of inflammable gas in the unventilated and 
inaccessible waste, which covered an area of about three acres adjoining the 
stooping places. There may be difference of opinion as to where this gas came 
from but the point is relatively unimportant. It  may have come up through 
breaks in the five fathoms of strata between the seam being worked and a 
seam below, about 2 ft. thick, which had been proved by bore hole. There 
is, however, no need to postulate such an origin, as the firedamp may eao;ily 
havc becn given off steadily over a relatively long period of time by small 
feeders from the Dunnet Seam itself or (rom the strata immedi<lt"ly associated 
with it. 
40. This accumulation of firedamp, whatever its origin, was normally in the 
higher cavities within the waste area, but its presence was not detected at the 
waste edge. So long as it was thus confined, the gas would not pregent any 
danger. How, then, did it come to be expelled and thus create a danger ? 
Firedamp in quantity can exude from a waste when there is a faU in barometric 
pressure or it can be forced out suddenly by roof movements in the waste and 
particularly by a heavy fall. \Vhilst there was a falling barometer at the time, 
• 
I S  
I think in this case the ga� was :;,uddenly expelled by a heavy fall in the wa�te 
shortly before the initial explosion. There was evidence of crush in James 
TOOd's \\ orking place before the mealtirne interval on the afternoon of the 
explosion and evidence of excessive crush after the meal-time when TOOd and 
Reid returned to work. In other words, the conditions at the time were �uch as 
were Likely to lead to falls in the waste. That th.e gas must have been expelled 
quickly is apparent from the evidence that a naked light was u"cd within a 
few minutes of the explosion at the face of the split near the waste edge im­
mediately above and to the rise side of ] ames Todd 's working place. l conclude, 
therefore, that the inflammable gas present in Todd's place when Reid and 
Todd returned to work after meal-time, about S p.m. on the night of the 
explosion, wa.., part of a larger body of gas expelled from the waste by a fall 
which occurred in the waste towards the end of the meal-time interval. 
ON THE CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION AND IT5 DEVELOPMENT 
4 1 .  There is no mystery as to the cause of this explosion. It  was entirely 
one of firedamp. The question as to whether or not coal dust played a part 
does not arise in a shale mine. The firedamp was, in fact, seen to be ignited 
at the acetylene cap lamp of Thomas Reid. The working place was about 
9 ft. high and with Reid standing his full height, it is clear that a hyer of gas 
was inflammable at a height of not less than 3 ft. from the roof. It is probable 
that at the point of ignition the firedamp-air mixture was just a little below 
the upper limit of inflammability. Again, judging by the lack of violence and 
the fact that neither Reid nor TOOd was burned, it was probably little more than 
a "  trail I t  of gas of similar composition until the flame reached the fringe of the 
larger accumulation in the waste when it produced what seemed, in effect, to be a 
second explosion. Because the inflammable mixture WCb now more extensive, 
rather than more explosive, the report of this second explosion was louder and 
produced greater physical effects, as is sho'\-'n by the fact that Todd and Reid 
were blown off their feet, while l\1cGarty, in the place lower down, \\'a<; knocked 
off his balance (as a result of the blast) and fatally injured, probably by his 
head violently striking a rigid, sharp object such as shale on the side of the 
roadway. 
42. The i.nitial explosion must have been relatively smalJ, as none of the three 
men in its immediate vicinity was burned. The second and larger explosion 
seems to have extended over a wider area mainly confined to the waste or 
waste edge. It  is highly probable that this was folJowed by a series of relatively 
light explosions or " pops " around the waste edge, due to the expansion of 
gases during the explosions and subsequent contraction, which would result in 
constituting a series of weakly inflammable mixtures. The evidence points to 
relatively slow burning as distinct from sharp explosive mixtures and sugge:>ts 
that flame persisted for some time, otherwise it is difficult to account for the 
more or less simultaneous occurrence of the subsequent fires in severa.l place:> 
adjacent to the edge of the waste. 
O� TilE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FIRES 
43. The occurrence of the ftres presents unusual features. There seems 
little doubt that in this case flame had continued long enough or recurred 
frequently enough to ignite dry timbers at the waste edge and that the pieces of 
burning timber ignited fallen shale. The roadways were not heavily timbered 
but the roadway containing most timber was probably the first upset from 
No. 1 0  to No. 1 1  Levels on the inbye side of No. 2 Dook. It will be rC'membcrcd 
that it was here the largest fire occurred. This fire probalby originated at the 
waste edge but by the time it was discovered all the timber in this roadway 
had probably been burned, thus allowing the 3 ft. of oil shnle which fonned the 
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immediate roof to faU. There was evidence to show that this roof shale had 
collapsed in thin slabs which stood on edge and thus presented easier condition" 
for being set alight.  In one part of tlus roadway near the junction with No. 1 1  
Level, which had to be recovered to aUow of rescue operations, no less than 
160 cubic yards of shale were burned to ash and the adjacent sides of the 
solid shale pillars had been set alight. 
44. Fortunately, the provision of fire-fighting materials and appliances and 
the arrangements for using these effectively, as required by the Coal Mines 
General Regulations of 8th August, 1938, were made, while it is apparent from 
the evidence that effective arrangements had been made to ensure the assistance 
not only of the general fire-fighting services of Scottish Oils Ltd., but also to 
ensure the assi�tance and services of the �ational Fire Service organization. 
Nevertheless there is room for a fir:it-class common fire-fighting service for 
mines of all classes, whether operated by the National Coal Board or not, 
based on or co-ordinated with the Mines Rescue Service. I should add also that 
events in tliis di.::;aster emphasized the need for an efficient mobile scientific 
serdce for the prompt analysis of s�mp!es of mine atmo<:.pheres and the inter­
pretation of the results of analyses-particularly where fires have developed­
during the actual progress of rescue and recovery operations. This scientific 
service should also be based on or co-ordinated with the Mines Rescue Service. 
ON THE RESCUE OPERATIONS 
45. As expected, those engaged in the rescue and recovery operations upheld 
the high traditions established by the men in the mining industry in these 
activities. Calamity is indeed man's true touchstone. I should like to record 
my tribute to the excellent work done by all concerned under very difficult 
and trying conditions over the long period from the occurrence of the explosion 
to the recovery of the bodies of the unfortunate victims. It was unfortunate 
that none of the trapped men was rescued alive, but that was in no way the 
fault of the representati\'eS of officials and workmen, the National Fire Service, 
the Mines Rescue Brigades or H.l\l. Inspectors who took part in the operations. 
46. I feel a special word of praise should be given to the members of the 
National Fire Service who, for the first time in their short history and, I believe, 
in the annals of mining, played a valuable part in the fire-fighting operations 
underground. Although intended and trained for fire-fighting on the surface, 
the teams concerned nenr hesitated for a moment when they knew the fire 
was down ill the workings of the mine. 
47. Although, as I have said, all concerned in the rescue operations arc 
worthy of praise, I have no hesitation in singling out the overman, David 
Brown, for special mention. His efforts to reach the trapped men in the early 
stages of the disaster, with and without self-contained breathing apparatus, alone 
and in company and as leader of a trained rescue team, were deserving of the 
highest praise. In all, he made no fewer than five attempts to reach the 
entombed men. He was indefatigable ; he displayed exceptional courage and 
determination, well knowing the danger involved, and I have already brought 
this to your notice with a view to its appropriate recognition. 
ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRECAUTIONS TAKEN TO SAFEGUARD AGAINST 
DANGER FROM INFLAMMABLE GAS 
48. As we have seen, the possibility of the occurrence of inflammable gas 
in the face workings at Burngrange was recognized and certain precautions were 
in fact taken to safeguard against possible danger from such occurrences. 
Briefly, these safeguards were that facemen in charge of places should use 
• 
• 
1 7  
safety electric cap lamps, that a flame safety lamp should be kept in each working 
place and that before the commeucement of work in a shift and before and 
after shot-firing. the faceman in charge should examine his place for gas. 
These precautions were in addition to the statutory examinations for gas with 
flame safety lamps by the firemen under Sections 64 and 65 of the Coal Mine!'­
Act, 191 1 .  \Vhcn the additional precautions were first published and instituted 
at the mine, it was also a requirement that each place should be examined for 
gas before the re-commencement of work following any cessation of work during 
the shift. It appears that in due course the original typed notice posted at the 
millC became defaced, and in re-typing it, this particular rule was not included. 
Nevertheless. it was stated in evidence that the practice of examining a place 
for gas during a shift following a cessation of work, such as a meal-time, was 
in fact carried out. Indeed, James TOOd, at the actual time of the explosion, 
had first entered his working place for this very purpose and would have carried 
it out but for the fact that he was so surprised by the erfecls of .. weighting " 
on the roof supports in his place that he called Reid up to see the destruc;tion 
wrought. But for this fortuitous and unfortunate circumstance, this tragic 
disaster might have been avoided. It is sad to think that on such a smaU 
matter, the fate of so many lives depended. 
49. 'I he questions arise as to whether these precautions were adequate and, 
in particular, why naked lights \ ... ·ere permitted to be used at working places 
adjacent to goaf or waste, having regard to the potential danger or inflammable 
gas being quickly expelled from wastes in dangerous quantity. I t  must be 
borne in mind, however, from the evidence at the Inquiry and from an 
examination of the records of the mine, that inflammable gas had previously 
been found very infrequently and in small quantity in narrow places usually 
being driven to the rise and that the potential danger of gas suddenly expeUed 
from waste or goaf onJy became apparent as a result of this disaster, a disaster 
unparalleled in the annals of oil shale mining. 
50. Nevertheless, it is clear and recognized by all concerned, that the precau­
tions in use prior to the disaster are insufficient. Indeed, the very fact of the 
explosion means that the provisions of Section 32 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 ,  
must now be implemented. Among these provisions is one which require" that 
" no lamp or light other than a locked safety lamp shall be allowed or used in 
any seam (except in the main intake airways within 200 yards of the shaft) 
in which an explosion of inflammable gas causing any personal injury whatever 
has occurred within the previous twelve months unless exemption is granted on 
account of the special character of the mine. I am of the opinion that only 
locked safety lamps should be pcnnitted within prescribed areas to include all 
working faces, but I am satisfied that exemption from the use of safety lamps 
is warranted by the character of the mine for those parts of it outside these 
areas. 
5 1 .  \Vhen discussing the precautions to be taken to prevent the recurrenc!! 
of a similar disaster, the question of blasting must also be considered. By virtue 
of Section I ,  the provisions of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 ,  apply to oil shale mines, 
Section 61 of the Act provided for regulations governing " the supply, use and 
storage of any e.xpiosives at mines or any class of mines ". The Order made 
under Section 6 1  of the Act is entitled ' The Explosives in Coal Mines Order ", 
This Order is in two parts. The opening words of Clause 5 (a) with which Part n 
of the Order begins, read as follows :-
.. In all coal mines in which inflammable gas has been found within the 
previous three months in such quantities as to be indicative of danger, no 
explosive, other than a permitted explosive as hereinafter defined shall 
be used . . .  "
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52. It i� clear, therefore, that Part I f  of the Order specifically applies to coal 
mines and not to any other class of mines. 
53. So far as Part I of the Order is concerned, there seems no doubt that 
it  was intended to apply to all mines to which the Act applies but it does not 
contain any clear and specific provision to that effect, and as it is entitled 
" The Explosives in Coa\ l\Iines Order ", the position is not free from ambiguity. 
In fact, the owners of oil shale mines ha\'c always been of the opinion that the 
Order is not applicable. 
54. Be that as it may, Part 1 of the Order is generally appropriate to oil shale 
mines. but to apply Part 1 1  would undoubtedly entail serious difficulties and 
some anomalies. It  is obviously desirable, howc\'cr, that the use of explosives 
Ll1 oil shale mines under all circumstances should be regulated. To clarify the 
position I am of the opinion that a separate Order under Section 61 of the 
Act should be made for this purpose. 
55. Bearing in mind that the workings in oil .shale mines in general are 
relatively free from inflammable gas and also that permitted explosives have 
recognized limitations in the blasting of oil shale, the requirements of the 
proposed new Order need not go so far as those in Part 1 1  of the existing Order 
applicable to coal mines ; bul, in the light of this particular disaster, I would 
recommend that in those seams or parts of seams of oil shale where safety 
lamps are required, the proposed Order should make the use of permitted 
explosive compulsory in all places in direct contact with, or about to hole 
through on, waste or goaL 
SG. It will, of course, be necessary for the manager to appoint in writing 
competent persons to fire shots where permitted explosives are used. But in 
the case of oil shale mines, where the system of working is Stoop and Room 
and where most of the .shots arc fired just before meal·time, I do not consider 
it necessary or advisable for the choice of such competent persons to be confined 
to tho'>C whose wages do not depend upon the- amount of mineral to be goUen. 
[n such circumstances, to confine shot-firing in a district to one shot-firer must 
inevitably tend to the " bunching " of shot-firing within a very limited period 
around the meal· time and to the consequent neglect of the proper examination.;; 
and other precautions to be taken before shot· firing. I see no reason why, 
under proper safeguards, a properly trained and experienced shale miner who 
has charge of a working place or places should not be competent to fire shots 
where pennitted explosives are used, and I recommend that provision be made 
accordingly in the proposed Order. 
CONCLUSIONS 
57. Summarizing the results of the Inquiry, I consider it established-
( 1 )  That the initial firedamp explosion originated near the waste edge 
close to the face of the rise split off No. 14 Level, one of James Todd's working 
places in the stooping section, No. 2 District, Dunnet Seam, when firedamp 
was ignited at the flame of the open acetylene cap lamp carried by Thomas 
Heid. 
(2) That the initial explo�ion was followed almost immediately by a second 
firedamp explosion, which �pread along the waste to adjacent places and that 
this explosion was followed by a series of lighter explosions and the burning 
of gas aJong the waste edge, causing flame to persist. 
(3) That the firedamp had collected gradually over a period of time in the 
higher cavities of the waste or goaf formed by the stooping, where its presence 
could not nonnally be detected, and that some of it had been expell�d 
therefrom into Todd's working place by roof movements or falls of roof m 
the waste shortly before the return of the workmen after their meal interval. 
• 
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(4) That the persistent flame caused fires ill at least five separate places, 
due initially to the ignition of timber at or near the wa.�te edge and the 
subsequent ignition of fallen or loose pieces of oil shale. 
(5) That the� fires were sufficiently brought under control to pennit of 
rescue operations but were not wholly extinguished, largely due to inacccssi� 
bility, with the result that the fire area had to be sealed of!. 
(6) That John McGarty was fatally injured through his head �triking a 
sharp object when he was blown down by the blast {Tom the �col1d explosion 
and that the 14 other men lost their lives from the effects of breathing 
afterdamp produced by the explo ... ions and subsequent fire ... 
(7) That there were no breaches of statutory requirements. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
58. The Inquiry has disclosed that it is necessary and desirable to effect 
certain changes and I make the foHowing recommendations :-
(I) That only locked safety lamps be pennitted within prescribed areas to 
include all working faces in the Dunnet Seam but that exemption from the 
full requirements of Section 32 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 ,  i� warranted 
by the character of the mine in respect of those parts outwith the prescribed 
areas. 
(2) That since there is some ambiguity as to the application of the 
Explosives in Coal Mines Order and some difficulty in applying it to oil shale 
mines, the use of explosives in such mines should be governed by a separate 
Order under Section 61 of the Coal Mines Act, 191 1 .  
(3) That by this Order any seam o r  part o f  a seam i n  mines o f  oil shale in 
which safety lamps are required by the Act or Regulations of the mine to be 
used, the use of permitted explosives should be made compulsory in all 
working places in direct contact with, or about to hole through on, waste 
or goal. 
(4) That properly trained and experienced oil shale miners in charge of a 
working place or places, should be eligible for appointment a3 competen t 
persons to fire shots where permitted explosives are used, notwithstanding 
that their wages depend upon the amount of mineral gotten. 
(5) That, whilst it would be unreasonable to prohibit by Regulation the 
practice of . .  stooping " elsewhere than at the return end of a ventilating 
district, or, in other words, to require that the air used for ventilating a 
" stooping " section, shall not thereafter be used for the ventil:ltion of other 
workings, ncverthelc..'is this practice should be resorted to only in special or 
exceptional circumstances. 
(6) That in each geographical Division of the National Coal Board there 
should be (a) a first-class common fire-fighting service, and (b) an efficient 
mobile scientific service for the prompt analysis of samples of mine atmos­
pheres and the interpretation of resuJts of analyses, for mines of all c1as..�, 
whether operated by the National Coal Board or not, based on or co-ordinated 
with a common and efficient Mines Rescue Service. 
59. Finally, I desire to express my sincere thanks to the representatives of 
the parties who appeared at the Investigation and to Mr. Offord, Clerk of 
Court, for the valuable help and assistance they gave me at the Inquiry. 
Because of their whole-hearted co-operation, it was possible to complete the 
Inquiry in two days. 
I have the honour to be, Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
A. M. BRYAN. 
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PARTICl'L\RS 0 .- PERSONS KILLED 
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